The American Public Power Association joined other electric trade associations in filing on the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) proposed rule for establishing drone flight restrictions over critical infrastructure.
The groups said they support the effort but told the FAA that its proposal would leave most of the grid unprotected, impose undue burdens on electric utilities seeking flight restrictions, and constrain utilities’ ability to use their own drones for maintenance and inspection purposes.
Joining APPA in the comments were the Edison Electric Institute, the Large Public Power Council and the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.
Background
The FAA’s proposed rule implements Section 2209 of the 2016 FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act, which lets fixed-site facilities apply for an “unmanned aircraft flight restriction” (UAFR) over their airspace. The proposal defines the types of facilities that can apply -- for electric utilities, generation over 500 megawatts and substations over 500 kilovolts.
It also establishes application requirements for demonstrating that a UAFR is necessary for public safety or national security, which include details of the facility’s specific vulnerabilities, existing security plans, and environmental impacts of imposing the UAFR, followed by a public notice-and-comment process. Finally, the proposal identifies which drone operations may still fly despite a UAFR.
The groups explained that the FAA’s proposal would pose practical and operational challenges as applied to the electric industry.
Specifically, they asked the FAA to:
• Expand the scope of eligible electric facilities to include all electric facilities and networks critical to national security, public safety, and essential economic functions, and account for the integrated, networked nature of the electric grid, to include the protection of vulnerable systems composed of multiple facilities, not simply individual facilities meeting specified criteria.
• Adopt a more risk-based framework for determining eligibility and security requirements to better account for a facility’s role in grid reliability, national security, support for critical loads, and vulnerability to cascading impacts.
• Revise the application process to address the significant security concerns that would follow from creating a centralized database of electric grid vulnerabilities and security plans.
• Revise the application process to eliminate costly and likely unworkable requirements that applicants obtain and submit information about third parties.
• Eliminate the advance notice and comment requirement, which would, as proposed, effectively give adversaries a roadmap of vulnerable facilities—and thus an attack roadmap.
• Give electric facilities control over their airspace by requiring advance approval for commercial and recreational flights over restricted airspace.
• Ensure that facilities can continue to effectively deploy their own drones over their own facilities for the array of safety, security, maintenance, restoration, vegetation management, emergency response, and other operational functions that they serve.
Once the rule is finalized, APPA members with eligible facilities will be able to apply for a UAFR.
However, enforcing the flight restrictions of any authorized UAFR will remain the responsibility of the FAA and law enforcement agencies.
